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INTRODUCTION
Jimmy and Barbara decided to marry while Barbara was pregnant with
another man’s child.1 When Jimmy heard that Barbara was pregnant,
Jimmy rushed to her place of employment and asked her to marry him.2 
At the time, Barbara truly believed that Jimmy, rather than the other man, 
was actually the father of the child.3 Jimmy and Barbara married in
September of 1989, and the child was born on February 6, 1990.4 Rumors
were flying, and Jimmy began to have doubts as to whether the child was
biologically his.5 Nevertheless, Jimmy raised and supported the child for
six years despite his suspicions about the child’s paternity.6 After almost
a decade of marriage, Jimmy and Barbara ultimately decided to divorce.7 
In the divorce proceeding, Barbara sought child support from Jimmy.8 
During the divorce, Jimmy took a DNA test and confirmed that the
rumors were true: he was not the biological father of the child.9 Under 
Louisiana Civil Code article 185, “The husband of the mother is presumed
to be the father of a child born during the marriage . . . .”10 Despite this 






7. Id. at 365.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185 (2019). Before the 2005 revision to the Louisiana
Civil Code, the court looked to former Louisiana Civil Code article 184 for the
presumption of paternity, but the language is still the same as the presumption of
paternity that is now contained in article 185. Id. art. 184 (“The husband of the
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2021] COMMENT 1525
presumption, under article 185, the husband of the mother is able to deny
such paternity through a disavowal action, although the law limits the time
allowed to file such an action.11 Although Jimmy was not the biological
father, under Louisiana law, he was still the presumed father.12 As a result,
Jimmy filed a disavowal action, seeking to have the court end his paternal
rights and duties over the child who was born but not conceived during his
marriage to Barbara.13 
The Louisiana Legislature revised portions of the Civil Code in 2005
involving disavowal actions; however, the only change in the law is that
the article makes explicit that the husband filing the disavowal action has 
a prescriptive period of one year.14 This prescriptive period begins to run
on the day of the birth of the child, or the day the husband knew or should
have known that he may not be the biological father of the child,
whichever comes later.15 Under article 189, Jimmy would have had a year
from when he began to have suspicions of the child’s paternity based on
the rumors he heard after the child’s birth.16 Under this standard, the suit
to disavow paternity in 1999 was too late because the rumors began to
circulate early in his marriage to Barbara.17 
Therefore, because his disavowal claim prescribed, article 185 still
presumed Jimmy to be the father of the child under the law.18 By applying
the presumption of paternity, the courts extended a safeguard to the child
in Lopez v. Lopez by maintaining the child’s status of having two legally
recognized parents.19 In Louisiana, cases like these, wherein a husband
seeks to disavow a child born of a marriage, are relatively simple to solve
with heterosexual couples by applying the relevant Code articles—in this
case article 185 and article 189—to the particular facts of the case.20 Here,
the language clearly states that the husband is presumed to be the father,
mother is presumed to be the father of all children born or conceived during the
marriage.”).
11. See id. arts. 184, 189 (2000); id. arts. 185, 189 (2019).
12. Id. art. 185 (2019); id. art. 184 (2000).
13. Lopez, 772 So. 2d at 365.
14. LA. CIV. CODE art. 189 cmt. a (2005) (“The only change in law made by
this Article is that the period of time for instituting a disavowal action under this
Article is explicitly prescriptive . . . .”).
15. Id. art. 189 (2019).
16. Lopez, 772 So. 2d at 366–67.
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185; Lopez, 772 So. 2d at 367.
18. Lopez, 772 So. 2d at 367.
19. Id.
20. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 185, 189.
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1526 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
regardless of whether the man is actually the biological father of the
child.21 
Consider a similar scenario, wherein a pregnant women gets married
before the birth of her child, but instead of marrying Jimmy, her male 
spouse, the mother marries Brittany, her female spouse.22 Brittany and
Nicole Boquet married on December 18, 2015.23 At the time of the
marriage, Nicole was pregnant from a previous relationship that Brittany
knew about.24 The child was born on February 5, 2016.25 A little over a 
year later, Brittany filed a petition of divorce, and Nicole subsequently
filed an answer seeking child support from Brittany.26 The court had not
granted the petition of divorce for the couple; so, the court ordered Brittany
to pay interim child support until it granted a final divorce.27 Shortly
thereafter, on April 28, 2017, Brittany filed a disavowal action of the
child.28 Brittany argued that article 185’s presumption did not apply to her
because she was not the “husband” of the mother, but instead was the
“wife” of the mother.29 Brittany’s claim hinged on a plain-reading and 
historical interpretation of the language in article 185 to establish that she 
was not a presumed parent of the child.30 The Louisiana Third Circuit
Court of Appeal rejected Brittany’s argument and decided that because the
child was born of the marriage, Brittany was the presumed parent of the
child just as a husband would be.31 The court stated that because the child
was born on February 5, 2016, Brittany owed the child support since her
time to file a disavowal action had prescribed.32 The court reasoned that if
article 185 did not apply, the law would not award the same benefits to a 
female spouse as those awarded to a male spouse, like in Lopez, and would
thereby violate Obergefell v. Hodges.33 
21. Id. art. 185.









31. Id. at 900.
32. Id.
33. Id. As expressed in Boquet, some may not believe that paying child
support is a benefit under the law; however, this obligation stems from the duty
of being a parent to a child, which is a benefit under the law. See LA. CIV. CODE
art. 224 (2019) (“Parents are obligated to support, maintain, and educate their
child.”).
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2021] COMMENT 1527
The Boquet case demonstrates that the presumption of paternity in
article 185, as currently written, denies same-sex couples the same
“constellation of benefits” that Obergefell requires.34 This inequitable 
treatment leaves same-sex couples at an unfair and unwarranted
disadvantage when seeking to prove a parent-child relationship.35 
Although Obergefell extended the right to marry to same-sex couples, the
decision has left the states with many questions as to how to apply
Obergefell to instances where laws have biological roots.36 Specifically,
the implications of Obergefell raise the question of whether the paternal
presumption in Louisiana law applies if the married couple is a same-sex
couple.37 
The Louisiana Legislature must redraft the Civil Code articles relating
to establishing paternal filiation, specifically article 185, or in the
alternative article 188, to ensure that the law extends same-sex couples the
same “constellation of benefits” given to opposite-sex couples in the same
situation.38 The current articles pertinent to marriage and filiation still
assume the couple in question is of opposite sex, thus making these articles
inapplicable to same-sex couples.39 Redrafting of article 185 would ensure
that Louisiana’s filiation laws are constitutionally sound under the
Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell, provide consistency among
Louisiana courts, and guarantee that children of same-sex couples are 
given equitable safeguards under the law.
Part I will explain the historical justification for the biological
presumption in the “law of filiation” and show how this presumption has
traditionally worked in Louisiana because the state has generally not
extended parental rights equally to same-sex couples.40 Part II will
examine the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell and how it affects 
traditional, biological presumptions often associated with parenthood.41 In
addition, Part II will examine Pavan v. Smith, which is the Supreme
Court’s most recent clarification of the overarching effects and
34. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 185.
35. Id.
36. See generally Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017); Boquet, 269 So.
3d at 900.
37. Leslie Joan Harris, Obergefell’s Ambiguous Impact on Legal Parentage, 
92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 66 (2017).
38. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 669 (2015).
39. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 86, 89.
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185; J.-R. Trahan, Glossae on the New Law of 
Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV. 387, 394–95, 400 (2007); Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 
1140, 1145 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2009).
41. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670.
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1528 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
implications of Obergefell.42 Part III will define the parameters and legal
effect of a presumption and show how the application of the presumption
in article 185 cannot apply in the same-sex marriage context. Part III will
also look at Louisiana’s current solutions to fix this issue, and the problem
that arises when applying those solutions. Part IV will propose that the
Louisiana Legislature redraft either article 185 or article 188. A redraft
would bring the Civil Code up to date so that it conforms with current
Supreme Court jurisprudence and provides necessary safeguards for the
children of Louisiana.
I. LAYING THE FOUNDATION ON LOUISIANA FILIATION
Historically, laws established filiation through a biological connection
between a child and his mother and father.43 Traditionally, marriage could
only exist between a man and a woman; however, Obergefell
acknowledged that marriage is a fundamental right that exists between any
two persons, including same-sex couples.44 As a result, states are grappling
with how to apply traditional biological laws that establish filiation— 
specifically, presumptions of paternity.45 In addition, Louisiana courts face
similar struggles with the Louisiana Legislature’s general unwillingness to
extend same-sex couples rights in marriage and parenthood, and Louisiana
courts must address a tough question of how to properly do so after
Obergefell.46 
A. Who’s Your Momma and Who’s Your Daddy?
Long before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell, the laws
of Louisiana used marriage as an important factor in establishing parental
rights and responsibilities in relation to children.47 Louisiana refers to the
parent-child relationship as the “law of filiation,” which is the juridical48 
42. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017).
43. Trahan, supra note 40, at 394–95, 400.
44. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670.
45. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078; Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 900.
46. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 185 (2019); Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d
1140, 1145 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2009).
47. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 185 (establishment of paternity is
determined by being the husband of the mother which puts an emphasis on a
connection between marriage and filiation); id. arts. 223–24.
48. Juridical, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“1. Of, relating to,
or involving judicial proceedings or to the administration of justice. 2. Of, relating
to, or involving law; legal.”).
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2021] COMMENT 1529
bond that unites a child to his mother or father.49 In essence, the purpose
of filiation is to establish the “who” of parental rights and obligations.50 
The establishment of filiation in Louisiana gives the mother or father
the ability to care for, supervise, protect, discipline, and instruct their
minor children.51 This obligation comes with certain rights and duties that
a parent owes a child as well.52 In addition, parents are obligated to 
support, maintain, and educate their children.53 In turn, the juridical link
of filiation creates reciprocal rights and duties for a child to obey their
parents.54 Filiation bestows upon children certain rights, such as forced 
heirship, a preeminent position in the law of intestacy, and a place in the
first category of beneficiaries entitled to institute wrongful death and
survival actions.55 
There are two categories of filiation: filiation “by nature,” often
referred to as biological filiation, and filiation “by law,” often called
adoptive filiation.56 On the one hand, filiation “by nature” describes a 
genetic link between parent and child that Louisiana Civil Code articles
184 and 185 provide for.57 Filiation arises from an actual or presumed
biological relationship between the parent and child.58 Procreation is the
biological act that is “presupposed” in the establishment of the parent-
child relationship.”59 All of the Louisiana Civil Code articles dealing with
the presumption of paternity, except for article 188, “presume[] an act of
sexual intercourse between the mother and the man presumed to be the
49. LA. CIV. CODE art. 178; Trahan, supra note 40, at 388 n.1 (citing GÉRARD
CORNU, DROIT CIVIL: LA FAMILLE NO. 195 313 (7th ed. 2001)).
50. Katherine Shaw Spaht & William Marshall Jr. Shaw, The Strongest
Presumption Challenged: Speculations on Warren v. Richard and Succession of
Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REV. 59, 65 (1976).
51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 223.
52. Id. art. 224.
53. Id.
54. Id. art. 228.
55. Id. arts. 888, 2315.1–.2.
56. Trahan, supra note 40, at 388 n.1 (citing JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT
CIVIL: LA FAMILLE: L’ENFANT, LE COUPLE 181–82 (20th ed. 1999)).
57. Magdalena Duggan, Mater Semper Certa Est, Sed Pater Incertus?
Determining Filiation of Children Conceived via Assisted Reproductive
Techniques: Comparative Characteristics and Visions for the Future, 4 IRISH J.
L. STUDIES 1 (2014); see LA. CIV. CODE arts. 184, 185.
58. Trahan, supra note 40, at 388 n.1 (citing GÉRARD CORNU, DROIT CIVIL:
LA FAMILLE NO. 198 315 (7th ed. 2001)).
59. EDUARDO A. ZANNONI, DERECHO CIVIL: DERECHO DE FAMILIA § 794 (2d
ed. 1989).
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1530 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
father.”60 Article 188 is the only exception because it states that “[t]he
husband of the mother may not disavow a child born to his wife as a result
of an assisted conception to which he consented.”61 Therefore, the
foundation of the paternal presumption in article 185 has its roots in
biology.62 The biological roots of the presumption make Boquet’s 
application of the article to a same-sex couple problematic.63 On the other
hand, filiation “by law” in Louisiana Civil Code article 199 requires an act
and judgment of adoption that “arises from the legislative will to create
something identical to this [natural] filial line so as to attach the adopted
child to an individual or to the spouses that the law institutes as
parent(s).”64 In other words, to establish filiation is to demonstrate a
biological or legal connection to a child’s mother or father.65 
1. The Modes of Establishing Filiation
Louisiana Civil Code article 179 provides three ways to establish
filiation: (1) proof of maternity; (2) proof of paternity; or (3) adoption.66 
Louisiana Civil Code article 184 states that to establish maternity, a
mother must prove a certain child was born to a certain woman by a
preponderance of the evidence.67 This article establishes that the mother is
the woman who gives birth to the child, and a person may prove maternity
at any time.68 This traditional concept of identifying the mother as the
woman who gave birth to the child traces back to the Ancient Romans.69 
The jurisconsults referred to the rule that governs maternal filiation as
60. Original Brief on Behalf of Brittany M. Boquet, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Boquet v. Boquet, 268 So. 3d 895 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-798), 2018 
WL 1910871, at *8.
61. LA. CIV. CODE art. 188.
62. Id. art. 185; Boquet v. Boquet, 269 So. 3d 895, 900 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2019); see Original Brief on Behalf of Brittany M. Boquet, supra note 60, at *8.
63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185; Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 900; see Original Brief on
Behalf of Brittany M. Boquet, supra note 60, at *8.
64. Trahan, supra note 40, at 388 n.1 (citing DROIT DE LA FAMILLE NO. 1194 
389 (Jacqueline Rubellin-Devichi ed., 1999)); see LA. CIV. CODE art.199.
65. Lucie R. Kantrow, Presumption Junction: Honey, You Weren’t Part of
the Function—A Louisiana Mother’s New Right to Contest Her Husband’s
Paternity, 67 LA. L. REV. 633, 636–37 (2007).
66. LA. CIV. CODE art. 179; see Henry S. Rauschenberger, To Kill a Cuckoo
Bird: Louisiana’s Dual Paternity Problem, 77 LA. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2017).
67. LA. CIV. CODE art. 184.
68. Id. art. 184 cmt. a.
69. Trahan, supra note 40, at 394–95; Duggan, supra note 57, at 4; see
Rauschenberger, supra note 66, at 1181.
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2021] COMMENT 1531
mater semper certa est (“the mother is always certain”) because mater is
est quem gestatio demonstrant (“the mother is the woman whom the
pregnancy points out”).70 Numerous modern civil codes still use the
Ancient Roman provision to establish maternal filiation, including
Louisiana.71 
Although, traditionally, motherhood has been generally easy to prove, 
the same cannot be said of paternity.72 Maternal filiation flows from the
visible fact of birth, while paternity has its roots in conception, which has
no outward manifestation to prove its existence.73 Therefore, in terms of
establishing paternal filiation, the law resorts to a presumption.74 
Louisiana Civil Code article 185 includes such a presumption when it
states that the “husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of a
child born during the marriage.”75 This way of establishing paternal
filiation, similar to the way of establishing maternal filiation, has its roots
in Roman law.76 The Roman jurisconsults stated the presumption of
fatherhood as pater is est quem nuptiae demonstrant (“the father is whom
the marriage points out”).77 Thus, marriage and filiation are often closely
70. Duggan, supra note 57, at 4; Trahan, supra note 40, at 395; see
Rauschenberger, supra note 66, 1181.
71. Trahan, supra note 40, at 395; Argentine CÓD. CIV. art. 242 (“Maternity
will be established, even without acknowledgment, by proof of the birth and the
identity of the child.”); German BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (Civil Code) [BGB]
§ 1591 (“The mother of the child is the woman who gives birth to it.”);
LUXEMBOURGEOIS CODE CIV. art. 341 ¶¶ 1, 2 (“Maternity outside of marriage can
be judicially declared. The child who exercises the action must prove, by any
means whatsoever, that he was born from the supposed mother.”); Mexican
CÓDIGO CIVIL FEDERAL (Federal Civil Code) [CC] art. 360 (“Filiation of children
born outside of marriage results, in relation to the mother, from the sole act of
birth.”); Portuguese CÓDIGO CIVIL [Civil Code] art. 1796(1) (“With respect to the 
mother, filiation results from the fact of birth and is established in the terms of
[other articles].”); SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB], Code Civil [CC]
art. 252(1) (“In regard to the mother, filiation results from the birth.”); Venezuelan
CÓD. CIV. art. 197 (“Maternal filiation results from the birth and is proved by
means of an act of declaration of birth inscribed in the books of the civil registry,
with the identification of the mother.”); see LA. CIV. CODE art. 184.
72. Trahan, supra note 40, at 400; see Rauschenberger, supra note 66, at
1182.
73. HENRI MAZEAUD ET AL., LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL: LA FAMILLE NOS. 82– 
824, 225–26 (Laurent Levenur rev., 7th ed. 1995).
74. Id.
75. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185.
76. Trahan, supra note 40, at 400.
77. Id.; see Rauschenberger, supra note 66, at 1182.
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1532 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
linked because traditionally, the husband—a word linked and associated
with marriage—is used to establish parenthood.78 Nearly every modern
legal system recognizes that the husband in a marriage is the father of the
children of that marriage, which article 185 codifies.79 
The presumption of paternity traditionally served several functions.80 
First, the biological link was difficult to establish because of technological
disadvantages; therefore, the presumption provided a “legal certainty for
purposes such as inheritance and succession.”81 This presumption of
paternity was necessary because DNA testing was not available until
recent years, and a focus on the biological relationship was the only way
to establish paternity.82 Second, the presumption preserved the marital
relationship between the couple in that it “protect[ed] the sanctity of the
marriages by assuming the husband and wife [had] both remained true to
their marriage vows.”83 Lastly, the presumption promoted the welfare of
the child because it provided the child with a father, the lack of whom
would produce a “devastating” result for the child in that the child could
be labeled a “bastard” who would no longer be entitled to support or
inheritance from his father.84 Essentially, the presumption of paternity
provides safeguards to the children of the relationship.85 However, these
safeguards can only be truly effective if both parents are legally
recognized. If both are not recognized as legal parents, and if something
were to happen to the sole legal parent of a child, a child could be deemed
“parentless” in the eyes of the law.86 
Finally, Louisiana Civil Code article 199 allows a parent to establish
filiation through adoption wherein “the adopting parent becomes the legal
parent of the child for all purposes.”87 This is only way in which the
78. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185; Trahan, supra note 40, at 400; see
Rauschenberger, supra note 66, at 1182.
79. Trahan, supra note 40, at 400.
80. Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing
the Marital Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 248–49 (2006).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 249.
83. Id. at 249 n.14.
84. Id.
85. Samantha Bei-wen Lee, The Equal Right to Parent: Protecting Rights of
Gay and Lesbian, Poor, and Unmarried Parents, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 631, 637 (2017).
86. Id.
87. LA. CIV. CODE art. 199 (2019).
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2021] COMMENT 1533
Louisiana Civil Code allows for a non-biological connection as a basis for
establishing parental rights.88 
2. Disavowing Filiation
Just as the Louisiana Civil Code establishes a method to form the bond
of filiation, it also provides a mechanism to sever the bond in limited
circumstances.89 Article 187 provides that the husband in a marriage can
disavow paternity of a child with “clear and convincing evidence that he
is not the father.”90 Disavowal actions exist to allow a husband in an
opposite-sex relationship to challenge the parent-child relationship when
the man could not possibly be the father of the child because of biological
impossibilities.91 A comment to article 187 shows the kind of “clear and
convincing evidence” that is needed for a successful disavowal action.92 
The comment states that other kinds of evidence such as “scientific or
medical evidence, including the results of blood tests or DNA prints, or
medical evidence of sterility; evidence of physical impossibility due to
location at the probable time of conception; or tangible evidence and
testimony of lay witnesses” must corroborate the husband’s testimony.93 
All of the appropriate evidence listed in the comment is linked to the point
of the disavowal action: for the husband of an opposite-sex marriage to
challenge paternity of the child by showing that it is impossible for him to
be the biological father of the child in question.94 In this instance as well,
there is no counterpart that extends to same-sex couples in the Civil
Code.95 
B. Times Change, Codes Change
The Louisiana Legislature often revises the Civil Code to stay updated
with advances in technology and social change.96 Because of technological
88. Garrett M. Cain, “Don’t Talk to [Legal] Strangers”: Louisiana’s
Parentage Policy and the Burdens It Places on Same-Sex Parents and Their 
Children, 16 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 167, 170 (2014).
89. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 179, 187.
90. Id. art. 187.
91. Id.
92. Id. art. 187 cmt. b.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. art. 187.
96. John T. Hood Jr., The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil
Code, 19 LA. L. REV. 18, 33 (1958).
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1534 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
advances, married couples no longer have to engage in sexual intercourse
to conceive a child.97 In response to modern technological advances, 
current Louisiana Civil Code article 188 provides another way to establish
paternity through assisted conception.98 The article states, “The husband
of the mother may not disavow a child born to his wife as a result of an
assisted conception to which he consented,” which is another way of
establishing paternity.99 Some married couples may not be able to
conceive biological children due to infertility.100 For opposite-sex couples, 
this is usually because of “functional infertility,” which is the inability to
have children for medical reasons.101 If a person is single or in a same-sex 
relationship, he or she usually encounters “structural infertility,” which is
not because of the inability to conceive but instead requires another party’s
biological assistance in combination with his or her own in order to
reproduce.102 If the couple decides not to adopt, but still wants children, 
another alternative is to turn to assisted reproductive technologies such as 
surrogacy,103 in vitro fertilization,104 or artificial insemination.105 As
97. Anne R. Dana, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal 
Parentage for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 353, 354 (2011).
98. LA. CIV. CODE art. 188.
99. Id. Louisiana Civil Code article 188 comment a defines assisted
conception as “not just artificial insemination,” but also “invitro fertilization and
embryo transfer.” 
100. Elizabeth J. Levy, Virgin Fathers: Paternity Law, Assisted Reproductive
Technology, and the Legal Bias against Gay Dads, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC.
POL’Y & L. 893, 896 (2014); see Reproductive Health: Infertility FAQs, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 16, 2019), http://www.cdc.gov/
reproductivehealth/infertility/ [https://perma.cc/4GF2-TTJW]. Infertility refers to
the inability to conceive biological children. Id.
101. Dana, supra note 97, at 359. Examples of functional infertility can
involve a man “having a low sperm count” or a woman “having no viable eggs,
or being unable to carry a baby to term.” Id.
102. Id.
103. Surrogate Mother, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.mer
riam-webster.com/dictionary/surrogate%20mother [https://perma.cc/42PF-CBG4]
(last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (“[A] woman who becomes pregnant by artificial 
insemination or implantation of a fertilized egg . . . for the purpose of carrying the
fetus to term for another person.”).
104. In Vitro Fertilization, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/in%20vitro%20fertilization [https://perma.cc/
27SE-UZCU] (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (“[F]ertilization by mixing sperm with
eggs surgically removed from an ovary followed by uterine implantation of one
or more of the resulting fertilized eggs.”).
105. Artificial Insemination, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/artificial%20insemination [https://perma.cc/C
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2021] COMMENT 1535
technology advanced and developed more ways in which couples could
have children, the law in Louisiana advanced as well in order to conform
with the advances in society.106 
C. Louisiana’s Treatment of Parental Rights of Same-Sex Couples Pre-
Obergefell: Black v. Simms
Before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell, Louisiana
courts were reluctant to grant parental rights of a child to a non-biological
parent involved in a same-sex relationship.107 Courts required that the non-
biological parent meet the “substantial harm” standard in order to gain 
custody. This standard requires the moving party to show that joint or sole
custody to either parent would result in “substantial harm” to the child.108 
It is only upon proof of “substantial harm” that the court may consider an
award of custody of the child “to another person with whom the child has
been living in a wholesome and stable environment.”109 
In Black v. Simms, Kimberlee Black and Kimberly Simms were in an
unmarried, same-sex relationship in Louisiana until 2004.110 During their
relationship, the couple conceived a child via artificial insemination, and
Simms gave birth to Braelyn Simms on January 29, 2000.111 Once the 
relationship ended in 2004, Black filed a petition seeking sole custody, and
in the alternative, joint custody with visitation of Braelyn.112 The trial court
and appellate court denied Black’s request, because it believed Black
needed to meet the “substantial harm” standard, the standard necessary for
nonparents to receive custody over children.113 Therefore, to have a
25U-H23T] (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (“[I]ntroduction of semen into the uterus
or oviduct by other than natural means”). See generally Dana, supra note 97, at
359.
106. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 188 (2019).
107. In re Melancon, 62 So. 3d 759, 764 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010); Black v.
Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1145 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2009); Susan Donaldson
James, Louisiana Gay Dad Raises Child, but He’s Powerless as Partner Skips
Town with Boy, ABC NEWS (July 16, 2012, 1:47 PM), https://abcnews.go
.com/Health/sex-families-risk-patchwork-state-parenting-laws/story?id=167883
41 [https://perma.cc/9QHC-UQ32].
108. LA. CIV. CODE art. 133 (2009).
109. Id.; Black, 12 So. 3d at 1144; see LA. CIV. CODE art.133 cmt. b (stating
that the substantial harm standard can described using the term “detrimental” to
the child).
110. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1141.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1141–43.
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1536 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
custody right of Braelyn, Black had to show that Simms’s maintaining sole
custody of Braelyn would cause Braelyn substantial harm.114 
Black claimed that she and Braelyn formed a parent-child relationship,
despite her lack of a biological link to the child because Black raised her
from birth and functioned as a parent during her relationship with
Simms.115 Because of this, Black argued that severing her relationship with
Braelyn would cause Braelyn “substantial harm.”116 In addition, Black 
argued that she and Simms made a joint decision to have a child.117 
Nevertheless, the court denied Black’s request because of the lack of
evidence showing “substantial harm,” which interfered with Simms’s
custody as a parent.118 Despite the fact that Black raised Braelyn as her
child and functioned as her parent, without marriage, the law did not give
Black the opportunity to be considered as a “parent” in the eyes of the
court when deciding custody rights of Braelyn.119 Unfortunately for Black, 
no language in the Civil Code provided her a means to establish a parental
link to the child, and the “best interest of the child” standard worked
against her since the court viewed her as a non-parent.120 
The Louisiana Civil Code mandates that in custody proceedings, the
court should give primary consideration to the “best interest of the
child.”121 This standard, first articulated in Black, is used throughout the 
Louisiana Civil Code regarding custody of children.122 The Louisiana
Legislature provides a detailed list of factors that the court must consider
when determining which course of action is in the child’s best interest.123 




118. Id. at 1145.
119. Id.
120. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 184, 185 (2019).
121. Id. art. 131.
122. See id. arts. 131–34.
123. The court is instructed to look at a detailed list of 14 enumerated factors
to determine the best interest of the child, including: 
(1) The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by Children’s
Code Article 603, which shall be the primary consideration. (2) The love,
affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child. (3)
The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love,
affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and
rearing of the child.(4) The capacity and disposition of each party to
provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material
needs. (5) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that 
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2021] COMMENT 1537
Only after the judge weighs these factors may he or she make a custody
decision that is in line with the best interest of the child.124 However, the 
best-interest-of-the-child factors are only used when there are two parents
who are involved in a custody dispute.125 
When the court is faced with a parent and a non-parent seeking
custody, the court uses a substantial harm test rather than a best-interest-
of-the-child test because parental rights are given primacy over non-
parents seeking custody rights of the child.126 In the event that a Louisiana
court is faced with a case like Black, where the mother’s long-time female 
partner is claiming custody over the child, the court must first look to
Louisiana Civil Code article 133 to determine whether substantial harm
would result if the biological parent retained custody of the child.127 The 
court will only separate a child from his biological parent and give custody
to a person the law deems a “non-parent” if the court finds that substantial
harm would result from the biological parent retaining custody.128 If the 
court finds no substantial harm to the child, then the court does not look to
the best-interest-of-the-child factors because the courts will, by default,
environment. (6) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home or homes. (7) The moral fitness of each party,
insofar as it affects the welfare of the child. (8) The history of substance
abuse, violence, or criminal activity of any party. (9) The mental and
physical health of each party. Evidence that an abused parent suffers
from the effects of past abuse by the other parent shall not be grounds
for denying that parent custody. (10) The home, school, and community
history of the child. (11) The reasonable preference of the child, if the
court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference. (12)
The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a 
close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party,
except when objectively substantial evidence of specific abusive,
reckless, or illegal conduct has caused one party to have reasonable
concerns for the child’s safety or well-being while in the care of the other
party. (13) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.
(14) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously




126. Id. arts. 132–34. This standard also relates to the fact that parents have
the obligation to support, maintain, and educate under Louisiana Civil Code
article 224. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
127. LA. CIV. CODE art. 133 (2019).
128. Id.
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1538 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
give custody of the child to the biological parent.129 If two biological
parents appear before the court in a custody dispute, then the court looks
to the best-interest-of-the-child factors.130 The best interest of the child is
a vital consideration for Louisiana courts when determining child
custody.131 This is because the Louisiana Civil Code makes clear that it
generally prefers parents in custody disputes, as evidenced by the way the
burdens are constructed.132 Laws already exist that automatically establish
filiation for opposite-sex married couples, thereby allowing them to take
advantage of the best-interest-of-the-child standard in custody disputes.133 
However, the law does not provide any way for a non-biological parent to
establish filiation in the same way as opposite-sex parents, thereby
depriving that parent of utilizing the best-interest-of-the-child standard in
custody determinations.134 
D. Louisiana Law on Marriage as It Relates to Same-Sex Couples Pre-
Obergefell
Long before the Supreme Court held that same-sex couples may
exercise their right to marry in Obergefell, Louisiana legislators made
clear that they believed marriage should only exist between one man and
one woman.135 The Louisiana Civil Code first referenced marriage as 
between a man and a woman in 1975.136 In 1987, the Louisiana Legislature
amended the Civil Code to expressly prohibit same sex-marriage.137 Again 
in 1999, the Louisiana Legislature amended the Civil Code to refuse
acknowledgement of same-sex marriage performed in other states.138 In
129. Id.
130. Id. arts. 132, 134.
131. See generally Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2009).
132. LA. CIV. CODE. arts. 132–34 (2019).
133. See discussion supra Part I.A.
134. See discussion supra Part I.A.
135. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015); PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LOUISIANA, GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT ON THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT (2004), http://parlouisiana
.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Guide-to-the-Constitutional-Amendment-on-
the-Defense-of-Marriage-Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC6N-YLZN]; H.B. 1717,
1987 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1987).
136. PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LOUISIANA, supra note 135.
137. H.B. 1717, 1987 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1987) (“Persons of the same sex
may not contract marriage with each other.”).
138. H.B. 1450, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1999) (“A purported marriage
between persons of the same sex violates a strong public policy of the state of
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2021] COMMENT 1539
2003, Massachusetts recognized a right to same-sex marriage in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.139 Fearing that a Louisiana
court might rule the same way as the Goodridge court, Louisiana, in 
addition to several other states, amended the state Constitution in 2004.140 
This amendment stated that:
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union
of one man and one woman. No official or court of the state of
Louisiana shall construe this constitution or any state law to
require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred 
upon any member of a union other than the union of one man and
one woman. A legal status identical or substantially similar to that
of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or
recognized. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall 
recognize any marriage contracted in any other jurisdiction which
is not the union of one man and one woman.141 
The amendment made clear that same-sex couples were not entitled to
a marriage right under any state law or the Constitution of Louisiana.142 
Cases like Black and the 2004 amendment to the Louisiana Constitution
reflect Louisiana’s traditional view, held by many other states, that
marriage and parenthood should only be available to a union between a 
man and a woman.143 Not only did the jurisprudence treat same-sex 
couples differently than opposite-sex couples, but the amendment to the
Louisiana Constitution shows that even the Legislature explicitly treated
same-sex couples differently as well.144 
Louisiana and such a marriage contracted in another state shall not be recognized
in this state for any purpose, including the assertion of any right or claim as a 
result of the purported marriage.”). The bill passed in 1999 and became law as 
part of the Louisiana Civil Code article 3520. Id.
139. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003)
(“We declare that barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and
obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a person of
the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”).
140. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LOUISIANA, supra note 135.
143. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1142–43 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2009).
144. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; Black, 12 So. 3d at 1142–43.
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1540 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
II. OBERGEFELL AND BEYOND
Throughout the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Supreme
Court acknowledged a variety of constitutionally protected, fundamental
personal and privacy rights.145 In addition, the Supreme Court extended 
several favorable decisions for same-sex rights.146 At the same time as
these Supreme Court decisions, Louisiana and other states continued to
expressly prohibit same-sex marriage.147 As a result, same-sex couples 
seeking the right to marry challenged such state laws.148 
A. Obergefell Turns the Country Upside Down
In Obergefell v. Hodges, 14 same-sex couples and 2 men whose same-
sex partners had died prior to the litigation challenged several state statutes 
that defined marriage as a union existing only between a man and a 
woman.149 One of the petitioners, James Obergefell, and his partner, John
Arthur, were in a relationship for two decades.150 During the relationship, 
Arthur developed ALS, and the couple wished to marry before Arthur
died.151 They traveled from Ohio to Maryland because same-sex marriage
145. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (recognizing the fundamental
right to an abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating
Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (extending the holding of Griswold to unmarried people); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (invalidating state law prohibiting use of
drugs or devices of contraception and the counseling, aiding, and abetting of the
use of contraceptives).
146. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding that a law 
preventing anti-discriminatory measures against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals was 
unconstitutional); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (holding that
consenting adults have the right to engage in public conduct in the privacy of their
homes); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013) (holding that sections
of the Defense of Marriage Act that denied federal recognition of same-sex 
marriage were unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty of the person protected
by the Fifth Amendment).
147. See generally LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15.
148. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); Windsor, 570 U.S. 744;
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003); Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
149. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 653–56.
150. Id. at 658.
151. Id.
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2021] COMMENT 1541
was legal in Maryland.152 Shortly after their marriage, Arthur died.153 
However, Ohio law did not recognize same-sex marriage and, accordingly,
prohibited the state from listing Obergefell as the surviving spouse on
Arthur’s death certificate, which deprived Obergefell of any life insurance
or other benefits that a spouse of a deceased person is entitled to.154 The 
application of the Ohio law toward same-sex couples compelled
Obergefell to file suit challenging the constitutionality of the Ohio 
statute.155 
Obergefell first filed suit in Ohio.156 Specifically, Obergefell
challenged Ohio Statute § 3101.01(C)(1) and (2), which stated:
(C)(1) Any marriage between persons of the same sex is against
the strong public policy of this state. Any marriage between
persons of the same sex shall have no legal force or effect in this
state and, if attempted to be entered into in this state, is void ab
initio and shall not be recognized by this state.
(2) Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex in any
other jurisdiction shall be considered and treated in all respects as
having no legal force or effect in this state and shall not be
recognized by this state.157 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor
of Obergefell.158 The court explained that the Ohio statute allowed for
Arthur’s death record to list his marital status at the time of death as
“unmarried” and would not list Obergefell as Arthur’s “surviving
spouse.”159 The court stated that ruling against Obergefell would violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because Ohio
would recognize an opposite-sex marriage performed out of state, and
Ohio only refused to recognize Obergefell’s marriage because it involved
a same-sex relationship.160 In a consolidated opinion involving other same-





156. Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013 WL 3814262 (S.D. Ohio
July 22, 2013).
157. OHIO REV. CODE § 1301.01(C)(1)–(2) (2005) (invalidated by Obergefell
v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)).
158. Obergefell, 2013 WL 3814262, at *7.
159. Id. at *2.
160. Id. at *3.
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1542 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Michigan,161 Kentucky,162 and Tennessee,163 the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the Southern District Court of Ohio’s ruling in
Obergefell’s case and held that “[a]ll Ohians must follow the State’s
definition of marriage.”164 The Sixth Circuit found that from the beginning 
of the nation until the present time, the states have always chosen to define
marriage as a union between a man and a woman, and if a state chooses to
change the definition, it should do so through the democratic process by a
vote of the citizens.165 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision created a circuit split between the Fourth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, which all found that state level bans
against same-sex marriage were unconstitutional.166 This circuit split
compelled the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari.167 The Supreme
Court considered two issues: (1) whether the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex 
and (2) whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to recognize a
same-sex marriage licensed and performed in a state that does grant the
right.168 The Court noted the “transcendent importance of marriage” in that
marriage “is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.”169 
161. A same-sex couple from Michigan challenged the constitutionality of
both the Michigan Constitution article 1 § 25 and Michigan Compiled Laws §
551.1, which denied them the issuance of a marriage license. DeBoer v. Snyder, 
772 F.3d 388, 396–97 (6th Cir. 2014).
162. Two groups of same-sex couples challenged the constitutionality of
Kentucky’s marriage laws, including the Kentucky Constitution § 233A and
Kentucky Revised Statutes § 402.005, which enabled the State to deny them
marriage licenses and the ability to be listed as parents on their children’s birth
certificates. Id. at 397–98.
163. Three same-sex couples challenged Tennessee’s failure to recognize their
marriages from other states because of Tennessee’s traditional definition of
marriage. Id. at 399.
164. Id. at 420.
165. Id. at 404.
166. Id. at 428 n.3 (“[M]arriage licenses are currently being issued to same-
sex couples throughout most—if not all—of the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits.”).
167. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). The Supreme Court granted
writ of certiorari to Obergefell’s case in a consolidated case to include the other
decisions which were overturned by the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.
168. Id. at 656.
169. Id. at 659–60 (noting that the institution of marriage has changed from
“an arrangement by the couple’s parents” to a “voluntary contract between a man
and a woman”; from a “male-dominated legal entity” under the doctrine of
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2021] COMMENT 1543
Even though marriage is noted as an “ancient” institution, the Court
acknowledged that it is not an institution that has stood “in isolation,” but,
instead, it maintains a history of “continuity and change.”170 
In its reasoning, the Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects “fundamental liberties” and the Court’s duty in interpreting the
Constitution is to identify and protect individuals’ fundamental rights.171 
In addition, the Court recognized past jurisprudence that established that
the Constitution protects the right to marry.172 The Court went on to say
that as a result of the states denying same-sex couples the right to marry,
the children of these families have grown up knowing that the country
considered their families as lesser than conventional families.173 In
addition, these children bear the burden of being raised by unmarried
parents.174 Indeed, the Court noted that states have contributed to the
fundamental nature of the right to marry by placing the institution of
marriage at the center of both the legal and social order.175 In many states,
marriage is the basis for an expanding list of certain governmental “rights,
benefits, and responsibilities,” which include taxation, succession rights,
inheritance rights, property rights, adoption rights, and child custody, to 
mention a few.176 
The Supreme Court held that by excluding same-sex couples from the
institution of marriage, states deny same-sex couples the “constellation of
benefits that the States have linked to marriage.”177 These historical
considerations of the changing nature of marriage led the Supreme Court
to state that the “right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty
of the person . . . under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment,” and as such, the states cannot deprive same-
sex couples of that right.178 As a result, the Supreme Court held that same-
sex couples have the freedom to exercise their fundamental right to
marriage on the “same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.”179 
coverture to a place of “equal dignity” for women in the abandonment of the
doctrine of coverture).
170. Id. at 659.
171. Id. at 663–64.
172. Id. at 664 (referencing decisions such as Loving v. Virginia that
invalidated bans on interracial marriages).
173. Id. at 668. 
174. Id.
175. Id. at 669.
176. Id. at 670.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 675.
179. Id. at 676.
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1544 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
This allows same-sex couples to celebrate and advance their relationships
and receive all the benefits that the states have attached to marriage.180 
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that same-sex couples have
the right to marry, it remains unclear and invariably difficult to apply
Obergefell to the broad scope of laws implicated in the seminal decision.181 
1. Equal Protection and Standards of Review 
In Obergefell, the plaintiffs challenged the various state laws on the
notion that they were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.182 This clause states, “No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”183 Under the Equal
Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has developed standards of review
under which to evaluate laws based on the class of persons affected by
those laws.184 There are three levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.185 The more suspect or
potentially discriminatory a law is, the higher the level of scrutiny the
courts will use to determine if the law in question is valid.186 Determining
the standard of review for a particular issue is of extreme importance
because the higher the level of scrutiny for a particular law, the higher the
probability that a court will find the law unconstitutional.187 
The highest level of review is strict scrutiny, which is triggered when
the classification is constitutionally suspect or involves a fundamental
right.188 A classification is suspect when the classified group has
historically been subjected to discrimination, is a minority group, or is a
group inefficiently protected by the political process.189 The Supreme
Court has identified race, national origin, and alienage as suspect
180. Id. at 675–76.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 653–56.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
184. Stacey L. Sobel, When Windsor Isn’t Enough: Why the Court Must 
Clarify Equal Protection Analysis for Sexual Orientation Classifications, 24
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 500 (2015).
185. RODNEY M. PERRY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44143, OBERGEFELL V.
HODGES: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LEGALIZED 1 (2015).
186. Id. at 1–2.
187. Id. at 7.
188. Id. at 1.
189. Id. at 1–2.
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classes.190 Under a strict scrutiny standard, the government bears the 
burden and must show that the law is “narrowly tailored” and serves a
“compelling government interest” that the government cannot accomplish
through less discriminatory methods.191 The second standard, intermediate 
scrutiny, applies when there is a quasi-suspect classification, which
usually involves classifications based on gender.192 When applying the
intermediate scrutiny test, the action must be “substantially related to
achieving an important government interest.”193 Any other classification
falls under the rational basis test.194 In order for a law to survive a rational
basis standard of review, the law must be “rationally” related to any
conceivable “legitimate government interest.”195 Under the rational basis
standard, the court presumes the governmental action is constitutional;
therefore, the burden is on the party challenging a law’s validity.196 
Even though it is well accepted as a matter of law that these three
levels of scrutiny exist, the Court sometimes uses different standards.197 
For example, the Court sometimes engages in what it indicates as a
traditional rational basis review, but it is really a “heightened rational
basis” or a rational basis with “bite.”198 In a heightened rational basis
analysis, judicial deference to the legislature is not as favorable as it is
190. Jeremy B. Smith, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the
Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to
Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2771– 
73 (2005).
191. PERRY, supra note 185, at 2.
192. Id.; Sobel, supra note 184, at 500.
193. PERRY, supra note 185, at 2.
194. Sobel, supra note 184, at 501.
195. PERRY, supra note 185, at 2.
196. Id. at 2–3.
197. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
568 (Wolters Kluwer 5th ed. 2015). For example, the current standard for abortion
is that the state must not place an “undue burden” on a woman’s access to an
abortion, a standard that is not one of the traditional levels of scrutiny. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
198. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 197, at 568; see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982) (holding that Texas education statute violated Equal Protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it provided free education to children of United
States citizens but denied that education to children of undocumented
immigrants); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985)
(invalidating a zoning ordinance because it had irrational prejudice against the
mentally disabled).
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1546 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
under the traditional rational basis review.199 It could be said that there is 
a spectrum for rational basis.200 On one side, great deference is given to 
the legislature under traditional rational basis review.201 On the other side,
heightened rational basis entails a more rigorous review.202 Therefore, the
Supreme Court articulates three rigid levels of review that a particular
issue may fall into; however, in actuality, an issue may fall into a range of
potential review standards.203 
2. The Standard of Review the Supreme Court Applied in Obergefell
Although the Supreme Court in Obergefell identified marriage as a
fundamental right, which would normally trigger a strict scrutiny review,
the Supreme Court did not apply a strict scrutiny test and did not specify
which standard of review was proper.204 Because the Supreme Court did
not specify a standard of review in Obergefell, states remain uncertain as
to what standard applies to cases that involve laws based upon sexual
orientation.205 There are only two options for the states when determining
the correct standard of review because the Court did not apply the strict
security standard when it decided Obergefell.206 This means the level of
scrutiny is either intermediate or rational basis.207 Justice Kennedy, who 
wrote the majority opinion in Obergefell, previously suggested in his
majority opinions in Romer v. Evans208 and United States v. Windsor209 
that a heightened rational basis standard is the appropriate standard of
review for courts to apply in cases involving allegedly discriminatory laws
199. Nancy M. Reininger, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center: 
Rational Basis with a Bite, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 927, 928 n.9 (1986).
200. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 197, at 708.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 568.
204. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015); PERRY, supra note 185,
at 5.
205. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017); see Boquet v. Boquet, 269
So. 3d 895 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019).
206. PERRY, supra note 185, at 2–3.
207. Id. 
208. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that a Colorado
amendment that repealed state and local laws that protected gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals was unconstitutional because the amendment imposed a “broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group”).
209. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (holding that Defense
Against Marriage Act is unconstitutional because it interfered with the dignity of
same-sex couples).
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2021] COMMENT 1547
based on animus210 against gays and lesbians.211 In Romer, Kennedy said
the only purpose behind the Colorado amendment was “animosity toward
the class of persons affected,” and because of that, it failed rational
basis.212 In Windsor, the Court overturned the Defense Against Marriage
Act (DOMA) because “no legitimate purpose overc[ame] the purpose and
effect to disparage” same-sex couples.213 The heightened rational basis
test, as articulated in Romer and Windsor, requires that a law bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose and must not
involve animus toward the class of persons affected.214 In other words, for
a law to be valid under heightened rational basis, it cannot involve an
“impermissible desire to disadvantage” same-sex couples.215 In
Obergefell, Kennedy used language that mirrored the heightened rational
basis test when he stated that “no lawful basis [exists] for a State to refuse
to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage.”216 According to Kennedy,
denying same-sex couples the right to marry had the purpose of demeaning
such couples because of animus toward them.217 This suggests that what
Justice Kennedy has designated as the heightened rational basis standard 
of review is what the Supreme Court intended to be the standard of review
for Obergefell.218 Accordingly, this test is the standard courts should use
when determining whether state presumption of paternity laws are
discriminatory because of a classification regarding sexual orientation.219 
B. Clarifying Obergefell: Pavan v. Smith
Obergefell held that same-sex couples have the fundamental right to 
marry that was traditionally limited to opposite-sex couples.220 However,
the Court failed to define what the same “constellation of benefits” meant
or the scope and extent to which it apples.221 This left many questions
unanswered and created legal discrepancies as to how certain “effects” of
210. Animus involves the “bare . . . desire to harm [the] group.” Id. at 770 
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)).
211. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770; Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
212. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
213. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775.
214. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770; Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
215. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 197, at 823.
216. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015).
217. Id. at 646–47.
218. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 681; Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770.
219. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770; Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
220. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 675–76.
221. Id.
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1548 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
marriage—traditionally linked to biology—might apply to same-sex 
couples.222 Not long after the Court’s seminal decision, another case made 
it all the way to the Supreme Court that clarified Obergefell’s holding.223 
Pavan is one of the first Supreme Court cases that clarified the holding in
Obergefell.224 
In Pavan, two married, same-sex couples, each of whom conceived a
child through anonymous sperm donation, brought an action against the
Arkansas Department of Health.225 Leigh and Jana Jacobs were married in 
Iowa in 2010, and Terrah and Marisa Pavan were married in New
Hampshire in 2011.226 Leigh and Terrah each gave birth to a child in
Arkansas in 2015.227 When the couples applied for birth certificates for
their children, each couple listed their respective spouses as parents of the
children.228 Under an Arkansas law, the Arkansas Department of Health
removed the non-biological spouse’s name from the birth certificates and 
listed only the birth mother’s name.229 Both couples challenged the
constitutionality of Arkansas statute § 20–18–401, which required the 
name of the mother’s male spouse to appear on the birth certificate when
the mother conceived the child through artificial means.230 The couples
argued that the statute violated Obergefell because it allowed for the
omission of a mother’s female spouse on the child’s birth certificate.231 
Arkansas statute § 20–18–401 stated that “the mother is deemed to be
the woman who gives birth to the child,” and if “the mother was married
at the time of either conception or birth . . . the name of the husband shall
be entered on the certificate as the father of the child” even if the mother
conceived the child by means of artificial insemination.232 With respect to
the two couples, the mother of the children did not have a husband, as
contemplated by the statute, but instead a wife, thereby leaving the court
to decide whether the Arkansas statute could apply under the given
facts.233 The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that § 20–18–401 passed 
“constitutional muster” and reasoned that the statute focused on the child’s 
222. Id.
223. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
224. Id.





230. Id.; ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401 (2019).
231. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077.
232. Id.; ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401 (emphasis added).
233. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077; ARK. CODE ANN. § 20–18–401.
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2021] COMMENT 1549
relationship with the biological mother and biological father, and not on
the marital relationship of husband and wife, which Obergefell stated 
required Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.234 Under the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s reasoning, a parent’s name on the birth
certificate is a right that emanates from being a biological parent of a child, 
as opposed to a person being a spouse of a mother.235 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court’s
decision, finding that the birth certificates are more than a “mere marker
of biological relationships,” because birth certificates give married parents
a “form of legal recognition” that is not available to unmarried parents.236 
The Court held that not putting the mother’s female spouse’s name on the
birth certificate in cases of artificial insemination denied same-sex couples
the same “constellation of benefits” of marriage as opposite-sex couples
and offended the holding in Obergefell.237 Therefore, Pavan helped to
show that Obergefell applies fully to more than just the right to marry and
extends to rights that the law traditionally associates with marriage,
namely parental rights.238 
III: THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE POST-OBERGEFELL
Pavan reached the U.S. Supreme Court only two years after
Obergefell, which shows how quickly states were already struggling to
apply the “constellation of benefits” and rights afforded to same-sex 
couples in the context of parental rights and duties.239 In Louisiana, 
Boquet, like Pavan, shows that Louisiana faces a similar problem of
applying Obergefell in the context of the paternal presumption to same-
sex couples.240 The biological presumption of paternity in Louisiana leaves
same-sex couples without the constellation of benefits and at an unfair and
unwarranted disadvantage when seeking to show a parental link to the
child for the purpose of establishing parental right and duties.241 
234. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077 (quoting Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3d 169, 177
(Ark. 2016)).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2078.
237. Id.
238. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670–71, 675–76 (2015).
239. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078; Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670. 
240. Boquet v. Boquet, 269 So. 3d 895, 900 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019).
241. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 185 (2019).
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1550 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
A. New Ruling, New Problems
Although the Supreme Court recognized a fundamental right to marry
for same-sex couples in Obergefell, the ruling left a major area of family
law unclear: parenthood, which the law has based off of a biological,
filiation linkage since Roman law.242 In Louisiana post-Obergefell, 
awarding same-sex married couples the same benefits opposite-sex
couples enjoy is legally problematic because the Louisiana Legislature
refuses to amend the Civil Code articles relating to marriage and
parenthood despite the Louisiana Law Institute’s consistent attempts to
propose such changes.243 In addition, the problem is further complicated 
because the simple solution of equitable application of the presumption,
as done in Boquet, does not fix the underlying issues.244 
1. The Workaround and Its Limitations 
Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell, the Louisiana
Legislature has not revised the Louisiana Civil Code articles relating to
242. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Presumption
Post-Obergefell, 84 UMKC L. REV. 663 (2016).
243. LA. STATE L. INST.: MARRIAGE-PERSONS COMM., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (2016), https://lsli.org/
files/reports/2016/2016%20Same-Sex%20Marriage%20Report.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/8T9L-64BK]; LA. STATE L. INST.: MARRIAGE-PERSONS COMM., INTERIM 
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE IN RESPONSE TO SR 143 OF THE 2016 REGULAR
SESSION, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (2017), https://lsli.org/files/reports/2017/
2016%20SR%20143%20Obergefell%20Same-Sex%20Marriage%20Interim%2
0Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/J44G-YX6C]; LA. STATE L. INST.: MARRIAGE-
PERSONS COMM., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE IN RESPONSE TO SR 143 OF THE 
2016 REGULAR SESSION, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (2018), https://lsli.org/files/
reports/2018/2016%20SR%20143%20Same-Sex%20Marriage%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/68KX-9ANW]; LA. STATE L. INST.: MARRIAGE-PERSONS
COMM., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE IN RESPONSE TO SR NO.143 OF 
THE 2016 REGULAR SESSION, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (2019), https://lsli.org/
files/reports/2019/2016%20SR%20143%20Same-Sex%20Marriage%20Annual
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8DQ-F7S2]; Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana
Senate Committee Rejects Use of LGBT-Friendly Language in Marriage Laws, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article
_360fecca-3945-525a-b918-0ffa8e460080.html [https://perma.cc/R79S-RVQ9]
(noting how the legislature has rejected modest revisions for gender neutral 
language in marriage code articles with only one senator of the committee voting
for the legislation).
244. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670; Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 900.
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2021] COMMENT 1551
marriage and filiation to reflect the change in the law.245 In certain
instances, the Louisiana Civil Code articles can still function by removing
the gender-specific language.246 For example, Louisiana Civil Code article
86 defines marriage as “a legal relationship between a man and a woman
that is created by civil contract.”247 The meaning of article 86 can easily
conform to Obergefell by simply removing the “man and woman”
language and replacing it with “between two persons” to have the article
read: “marriage is a legal relationship between two persons that is created
by civil contract.”248 In addition, other Louisiana Civil Code articles, such 
as article 89, which states that “persons of the same sex may not contract
marriage with each other,” are wholly unconstitutional following
Obergefell because they violate Obergefell’s holding that “same-sex 
couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.”249 
However, the problem in applying certain Louisiana Civil Code
articles to same-sex couples cannot be solved where the gender-specific 
language in the article is the premise of the rule. One example is Louisiana
Civil code article 185, the code article at issue in Boquet, which states that
the “husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of a child born
during the marriage.”250 Article 185 presumes that marriage exists only 
between a man and a woman, thereby justifying the traditional biological
presumption of filiation.251 Nonetheless, the presumption as applied to an 
opposite-sex couple does make rational, policy-based sense in light of the
history of the biological presumption.252 Article 185 presumes that if a
husband and wife are married, and the wife becomes pregnant, the child is
her husband’s biological child as a result of sexual relations between the
245. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 86, 89 (2019).
246. See generally id. arts. 86, 185.
247. Id. art. 86.
248. See id.
249. Id. art. 89 (“Persons of the same sex may not contract marriage with each
other.”); id. art. 96 (“A purported marriage between parties of the same sex does
not produce any civil effects.”); Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2605; see Robicheaux v.
Caldwell, No. 13-5090, 2015 WL 4090353 (E.D. La. July 2, 2015) (noting how
the federal district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled that “Article 
XII § 15 of the Louisiana Constitution, Article 89 of the Louisiana Civil Code, 
and laws enacted pursuant thereto, violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and may not be enforced against the Plaintiffs or any
other same-sex couple”).
250. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185 (emphasis added).
251. Trahan, supra note 40, at 400.
252. Id.
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1552 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
couple that produced the child.253 However, this biological presumption
can never apply in same-sex relationships because one of the spouses can
never be the biological parent of the child. Although a woman’s husband
gets this presumption, it simply does not make sense to extend such a
biological presumption to a woman’s wife.254 The presumption in article 
185 was the main controversy in Boquet. 255 If established, the presumption
in article 185 bestows certain rights and duties upon a person, such as
custody and child support, respectively.256 
2. Battle within the Louisiana Legislature
Obergefell represented a very drastic change in the law, and as such,
the Civil Code articles relating to marriage and filiation need legislative
redrafting to reflect the country’s evolving views on marriage. In 2018,
Senator J.P. Morell introduced Senate Bill 98, which would have changed
the language in certain Louisiana Civil Code articles “to be gender neutral”
and inclusive of same-sex couples.257 For example, the proposed bill
changed references of “husband” and “wife” to “spouse,” and instances of
“mother,” “father,” “grandmother,” and “grandfather” to “parent” and
“grandparent.”258 Gene Mills, the head of the Louisiana Family Forum,
testified against the senator’s proposed legislation, saying that “often
Louisiana offers a different opinion than the U.S. Supreme Court, which
has been reversed in over 200 occasions.”259 In other words, Mills’ main 
argument rested on a notion that Louisiana should not update the Civil
Code to be in line with Obergefell, on the off chance that the Supreme
Court overturns Obergefell and makes same-sex marriage illegal again.260 
This opinion goes against the principles of Louisiana law as a civilian 
jurisdiction because, if left unrevised, Louisiana courts will be left
interpreting now unconstitutional articles, and in some instances, the
253. LA. CIV. CODE art. 98 (supporting the notion that the biological
presumption in article 185 also stems from the duty spouses owe each other in
article 98, specifically the duty of fidelity).
254. Id. art. 185; see Trahan, supra note 40, at 400.
255. Boquet v. Boquet, 269 So. 3d 895, 897, 900 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019).
256. See discussion supra Part I.A.
257. O’Donoghue, supra note 243; S.B. 98, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018).
258. S.B. 98, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018).
259. O’Donoghue, supra note 243.
260. Id.
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2021] COMMENT 1553
current state of the law may force courts to “make” new law, which is the
job of the legislature, not the courts.261 
B. The Basic Function of Presumptions in the Law
A “presumption” is a legal term defined as a “legal inference or
assumption that a fact exists because of the known or proven existence of
some other fact or group of facts.”262 Louisiana Civil Code article 185
establishes a presumption that a husband is the father of children born
during the marriage.263 This marital presumption of paternity in Louisiana
is regarded as the “strongest presumption in the law.”264 It is also a
presumption that is both legal and evidentiary.265 
The legislature establishes legal presumptions through specific
language in the law.266 If a presumption exists in the Louisiana Civil Code,
then it has a function as a legal presumption, and the Louisiana Civil Code
has many examples of such presumptions.267 The Louisiana Civil Code
gives “probative force” to legal presumptions, which removes the burden
from the party in whose favor the presumption exists.268 In other words, 
legal presumptions shift the burden of proof onto the party who claims the
presumption is not true.269 In certain instances, a person may rebut a
presumption by using evidence to contradict it; however, in some instances
a presumption is conclusive, which means a person cannot contradict it.270 
261. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2019) (“The sources of law are legislation and
custom.”); see id. art. 2 (“Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will.”); 
id. art. 1 cmt. b (“According to civilian doctrine, legislation and custom are
authoritative or primary sources of law. They are contrasted with persuasive or
secondary sources of law such as jurisprudence, doctrine, conventional usages,
and equity, that may guide the court in the absence of legislation and custom.”)
(emphasis added).
262. Presumption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
263. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185.
264. Id. art. 185 cmt. b.
265. Trahan, supra note 40, at 400.
266. Geoffrey J. Orr, Toward a Workable Civil Presumptions Rule in
Louisiana, 53 LA. L. REV. 1625, 1628 (1993).
267. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2340 (“Things in the possession of a spouse during
the existence of a regime of community of acquets and gains are presumed to be 
community.”) (emphasis added); see id. art. 2480 (“When the thing sold remains
in the corporeal possession of the seller the sale is presumed to be a simulation.”)
(emphasis added).
268. Orr, supra note 266, at 1629.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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1554 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
A conclusive presumption can be viewed as more of a presumption in
disguise because it is really a substantive rule of law.271 
The presumption in article 185 is rebuttable because of the existence
of the disavowal action in article 187.272 Article 187 states that the
“husband may disavow paternity of the child by clear and convincing
evidence that he is not the father.”273 Therefore, the existence of the
disavowal action serves to rebut the presumption of paternity that exists in
article 185.274 In addition, the responsibility is on the husband to bring the
disavowal action for proper relief to defeat the presumption of article
185.275 
The Louisiana Code of Evidence defines an evidentiary presumption
as an inference the legislature creates that the fact finder must draw if it
finds that the predicate fact exists unless the fact finder decides it is not
persuaded that the inferred fact exists.276 A “predicate fact” is a fact that a
party establishes to receive the benefit of the presumption.277 For example, 
if a mother proves that a man was her husband during the time the child
was conceived—the predicate fact—the fact finder must infer that the man
is the father—the required inference—even if no actual evidence is 
presented of the child’s paternity.278 
The purpose of such a presumption in the law is that the presumption
tends to “coincide with what probably is true.”279 In the context of
Louisiana Civil Code article 185, the presumption that the husband of the
mother is the father of the child “probably is true.”280 To overcome an 
evidentiary presumption, the challenging party must do two things.281 
First, the party that challenges the presumption must show evidence to
rebut the inference the presumption gives.282 Second, the evidence that the
contesting party shows must convince the fact finder that the presumed
fact is untrue.283 Presumptions in the law provide a great advantage for
271. Keith B. Hall, Evidentiary Presumptions, 72 TUL.L.REV. 1321, 1322 (1998).
272. LA. CIV. CODE art. 187.
273. Id.; Disavow, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (disavowal is
to “disclaim knowledge or responsibility for”).
274. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 187.
275. Id.
276. LA. CODE EVID. art. 302(3) (2019).
277. Id. art. 302(2).
278. Hall, supra note 271, at 1322.
279. Id. at 1326.
280. LA. CIV. CODE art.185; Hall, supra note 271, at 1326.
281. Hall, supra note 271, at 1323.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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those in whose favor they work. This is especially true of the paternal
presumption included in article 185 because it is often extremely difficult
to overcome the presumption since the burden is so high.284 
C. With the Right to Marry Comes the Right to Divorce
A gender-specific presumption, such as the one contained in article
185, is problematic because same-sex couples are raising more than two
million children nationwide, and in Louisiana, 20% of same-sex couples
are raising children.285 Louisiana is not alone—paternal filiation in almost
every other state uses similar language that the “husband or man” is
“presumed” to be the father to establish the parent-child relationship.286 In
284. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 185.
285. Population Density of Same-sex Couples: Louisiana, UCLA SCHOOL OF
LAW WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/visualization
/lgbt-stats/?topic=SS&area=22#density [https://perma.cc/HM7C-2DSR] (last
visited Sept. 25, 2019); Cain, supra note 88, at 180; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1852.
286. ALA. CODE § 26–17–204(a)(1) (2019) (“A man is presumed to be the
father of a child if . . . [h]e and the mother of the child are married to each other
and the child is born during the marriage.”) (emphasis added); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§25–814(A) (2019) (“A man is presumed to be the father of the child if . . . [h]e
and the mother of the child were married at any time in the ten months
immediately preceding the birth . . . .”) (emphasis added); DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 8– 
204(a)(1) (2019) (“A man is presumed to be the father of a child if . . . [h]e and
the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage . . . .”) (emphasis added); KAN. STAT. § 23–2208(a)(1) (2019) (“A man
is presumed to be the father of a child if . . . [t]he man and the child's mother are,
or have been, married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage . . . .”) (emphasis added); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 6(a)(1) (2019)
(“[A] man is presumed to be the father of a child . . . if . . . he is or has been
married to the mother and the child was born during the marriage, or within three
hundred days after the marriage was terminated by death, annulment or
divorce . . . .”) (emphasis added); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40–11A–204(A)(1)
(2019) (“A man is presumed to be the father of a child if . . . he and the mother of
the child are married to each other and the child is born during the marriage . . . .”)
(emphasis added); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14–20–10(1)(a) (2019) (“A man is 
presumed to be the father of a child if . . . [h]e and the mother of the child are
married to each other and the child is born during the marriage.”) (emphasis
added); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700–204(A)(1) (2019) (“A man is presumed to be 
the father of a child if . . . [h]e and the mother of the child are married to each
other and the child is born during the marriage . . . .”) (emphasis added); TENN.
CODE § 36–2–304(a)(1) (2019) (“A man is rebuttably presumed to be the father
of a child if . . . [t]he man and the child's mother are married or have been married
to each other and the child is born during the marriage . . . .”) (emphasis
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1556 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
addition, in 2017, there were a total of 787,251 divorces in the United
States.287 Because the Supreme Court has recognized same-sex couples’
right to marry, it follows that same-sex couples also have the right to
divorce.288 As seen in Boquet, during same-sex couple divorce 
proceedings, courts must determine custody and support of children.289 
Additionally, as seen in Black, the courts give preference to legally 
established parents in determination of custody.290 Children of same-sex 
couples are at a greater risk of being legally parentless because there is not
a presumption in the Civil Code that allows both of their parents to be
immediately recognized as legal parents.291After Obergefell, there have
been varying attempts to try to “fix” the situation of applying the paternal
presumption to same-sex couples.292 
D. An Inequitable “Equitable” Fix
In Boquet, the Louisiana Third Circuit applied the presumption of
paternity in article 185 equitably to same-sex couples.293 The Boquet court
acknowledged that the application of article 185 proved consequential
considering the article used the word “husband” and the issue for the court
involved a “wife.”294 In order to satisfy Obergefell’s same “constellation
of benefits,” the court applied the presumption of paternity to the female
spouse to ensure it treated her the same way a court would treat a male
spouse in this situation.295 
added); TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.204(a)(1) (201) (“A man is presumed to be the
father of a child if . . . he is married to the mother of the child and the child is born
during the marriage . . . .”) (emphasis added); WYO. STAT. § 14–2–504(a)(i)
(2019) (“A man is presumed to be the father of a child if . . . [h]e and the mother
of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage . . . .”) (emphasis added).
287. National Center for Health Statistics: Marriage and Divorce, CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/
marriage-divorce.htm [https://perma.cc/72T8-C2YC] (lasted visited May 5, 
2020).
288. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015).
289. Boquet v. Boquet, 269 So. 3d 895, 900 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019).
290. Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1142–43 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2009);
LA. CIV. CODE art. 132 (2019); id. arts. 133–34.
291. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185.
292. Id.; Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 900.
293. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670; Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 900.
294. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185; Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 900.
295. Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 900. Other states have applied this method of
reasoning as well in extending the biological presumption equitably. See LC v. 
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2021] COMMENT 1557
The Uniform Parentage Act similarly applies the presumption of
paternity equitably in its version of the filiation statute, which the Uniform 
Law Commission redrafted to conform with Obergefell.296 The Uniform
Parentage Act is a proposed legislative act drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws to provide states
with a legal framework for establishing parent-child relationships.297 
At first glance, an equitable application of the presumption is already
in accordance with article 4, which makes it appear to be the perfect
solution to applying the presumption of paternity in article 185 to same-
sex couples.298 Therefore, this equitable solution would not require a
redraft of the Louisiana Civil Code, but this solution puts the burden on
the courts to apply this remedy.299 This equitable application would also 
protect and provide a safeguard for the child of same-sex parents to ensure
that he has the support and care of two legal parents instead of only one.300 
Applying the presumption of paternity equitably to same-sex couples
would seemingly satisfy the holding in Obergefell because it would extend
the same “constellations of benefits” of the laws relating to marriage, and
provide safeguards to children of those unions.301 Although this equitable 
remedy seemingly applies to laws on marriage, it does not apply to laws
on filiation as easily.302 
MG & Child Support Enf’t Agency, 430 P.3d 400 (Haw. 2018); Mclaughlin v.
Jones, 401 P.3d 492 (Ariz. 2017); In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494
(N.H. 2014).
296. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (2017) (“[A]n individual is presumed to be 
a parent of a child if . . . the individual and the woman who gave birth to the child
are married to each other and the child is born during the marriage . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
297. Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (2017), https://www
.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d2
0-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f [https://perma.cc/4U8Q-E88F].
298. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (2019).
299. Id.
300. Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 900.
301. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015); see LA. CIV. CODE art.
185.
302. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670; see LA. CIV. CODE art. 185.
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1. Filling the Lacuna,303 Loyacano Style
Boquet is not the first time that a Louisiana court has considered an
equitable solution to a statutory problem.304 In Loyacano v. Loyacano, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court decided whether an award of alimony applied
equally to men as it did to women.305 The then-existing article 160 stated
that “[w]hen the wife has not been at fault, and she has no sufficient means
for her support, the Court may allow her, out of the property and earning
of her husband, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his
income.”306 The husband in Loyacano argued that article 160 was
unconstitutional and violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the law
stated that the court could only award wives alimony.307 In Loyacano, there 
was no positive law that allowed the court to grant the husband alimony;
therefore, a gap existed in the law.308 However, the court recognized that
the absence of such law does not mean that the court cannot grant relief.309 
On the contrary, once the gap in the law has been identified, the judge can
fill the gap equitably under Louisiana Civil Code article 4.310 Namely, 
when the court derives no solution to a particular situation using legislation
or custom, “the court is bound to proceed equitably.”311 The Court held 
303. Lacuna, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictio
nary/lacuna [https://perma.cc/LRT2-YDP7] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (“a blank
space or a missing part: GAP”).
304. Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 900; see Loyacano v. Loyacano 358 So. 2d 304 (La.
1978), judgement vacated, 440 U.S. 952 (1979), on remand, 375 So. 2d 1314 (La.
1980).
305. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d at 306.
306. LA. CIV. CODE art. 160 (1978). This article has since been changed to be
gender neutral: “When a spouse has not been at fault prior to the filing of a petition
for divorce and is in need of support, based on the needs of that party and the
ability of the other party to pay, that spouse may be awarded final periodic
support . . . .” Id. art. 112 (2019).
307. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d at 307.
308. Id. The gap is that article 160 only stated that a wife could receive alimony
but did not mention a husband, thereby creating a gap in the law. See LA. CIV.
CODE art. 160 (1978).
309. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d at 307.
310. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (2019); Vernon V. Palmer, The Many Guises of
Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction: A Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 TUL.
L. REV. 7, 10 (1994).
311. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (2019); Palmer, supra note 309, at 10 (“This role of
judge as ‘gap’ or ‘lacuna’ filler derives from the classic civilian concept which
views the judge as a ‘legislator of last resort’ who fills the ‘lacunas’ when the 
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  451 5/26/21  11:50 AM





     











    
  
    
 
   
 
   
    
  
 
   
  
     
 
 
    
     
    
   
   
      
      
      
      
           
         
      
        
2021] COMMENT 1559
that looking to legislative intent identified the legislature’s policy
considerations in enacting a law to award alimony to wives.312 The court
found that the law was rooted in the idea that an ex-spouse might need
support, and therefore, an ex-husband in need of support satisfied the 
policy rationale.313 This led the court to determine that husbands, just like
wives, could receive alimony.314 
The equitable approach under Louisiana Civil Code article 4 that the 
Court applied to the paternal presumption under article 185 in Loyacano
and Boquet simply does not apply in the context of a same-sex couple
because the presumption rests on the biological assumption related to
filiation.315 Extending the presumption equitably to same-sex couples to
fix the problem is fundamentally unsound because it upsets the traditional
foundation and reason for the existence of the presumption in the first
place.316 In addition, if the court extends the presumption to a same-sex 
spouse, as it did in Boquet, a disavowal action in that context would make
no sense.317 In Boquet, after the court applied the presumption equitably,
it stated that Brittany’s time to file a disavowal action had prescribed.318 
Under the same equity principle, the court extended the same right to seek
a disavowal action that a husband of a marriage has to Brittany—a same-
sex spouse.319 In a typical disavowal action, the husband must present clear
and convincing evidence that he is not the biological father of the child.320 
The fact that the Boquet court contemplated a disavowal action makes little
sense, because the only evidence Brittany, or any same-sex spouse, would
be able to offer in a disavowal action is evidence that he or she is not the
biological parent—a fact that is already known.321 Therefore, simply 
applying an equitable fix does not remedy the problem of extending
parental rights to same-sex couples.322 
positive law on the matter is silent.”). See generally Mitchell Franklin, Equity in
Louisiana: The Role of Article 21, 9 TUL. L. REV. 485 (1935).
312. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d at 309.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Singer, supra note 80, at 249.
316. Trahan, supra note 40, at 400.
317. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
318. Boquet v. Boquet, 269 So. 3d 895, 900 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019).
319. LA. CIV. CODE art. 187 (2019); see discussion supra Part I.B.2.
320. Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 900; see discussion supra Part I.B.
321. See generally Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 900.
322. See generally id. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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1560 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
2. Adopt the Child, Adopt the Presumption?
One apparent solution in cases where one spouse in a same-sex 
marriage has a biological child through artificial means is for the non-
birthing spouse to simply adopt the child and establish the parent-child
relationship under article 179 and article 199.323 However, this solution is
unconstitutional under Obergefell because the husband of a marriage
would never have to adopt a child born during the marriage, thus violating 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.324 The 
husband is always entitled to the presumption that makes him the
presumed father.325 Adoption can devolve into a potentially expensive and
lengthy process for the same-sex spouse to whom the law does not afford
the presumption.326 Therefore, because the wife of a same-sex couple
would have to adopt as the only way to establish a parent-child
relationship, this gap in the law violates the “constellation of benefits”
requirement from Obergefell.327 This proposed solution is unsatisfactory 
as it would impose additional burdens on same-sex couples simply
because they cannot rely upon the “presumption of paternity” to establish
parental rights and duties.328 These two potential solutions of equity and
adoption are wholly inadequate, and thus the Louisiana Legislature must
develop a better solution to uphold the filiation rights of same-sex 
spouses—and in turn, preserve the best interest of the children of same-
sex couples.329 
323. LA. CIV. CODE art. 179; id. art. 199.
324. Id. art. 185. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 672, 675
(2015).
325. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185.
326. When a stepparent attempts to adopt their spouse’s child it is often
referred to as “intrafamily adoption.” KATHERINE SHAW SPAHT & JOHN RANDALL
TRAHAN, FAMILY LAW IN LOUISIANA 581 (2009); Louisiana Adoption 
Requirements, AMERICAN ADOPTIONS, https://www.americanadoptions.com/
louisiana-adoption/louisiana-adoption-requirements [https://perma.cc/PLF6-KEN7]
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
327. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670.
328. Sophia Makris, Adam & Eve, Adam & Steve, and Ada & Eve: Gender
Neutrality in Defining Parental Status in Assisted Reproduction, 36 REVIEW OF
LITIGATION 743, 766 (2018).
329. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 179, 199.
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2021] COMMENT 1561
IV. THE TIME TO ACT IS NOW: REVISING FILIATION ARTICLES TO
ACCORD WITH OBERGEFELL
In Louisiana, the Boquet approach, which applies the principles of
equity, only applies to courts under the Third Circuit’s jurisdiction and is
not binding on other Louisiana courts dealing with the paternal
presumption in the context of a same-sex marriage.330 Therefore, a uniform
solution is necessary to protect the children and spouses of same-sex 
relationships.331 Consistent standards across the state will reduce the
potential adverse effects upon these parties—such as a lack of child
support, custody rights, and inheritance rights.332 To ensure the law affords
the same “constellation of benefits” to same-sex couples as it does to
opposite-sex couples, a legislative redraft of article 185 is imperative.333 
In an ideal world, the Louisiana Legislature would update all of the 
Civil Code articles relating to marriage and filiation in accordance with 
Obergefell.334 Unfortunately, the chance that the Louisiana Legislature
will redraft all of the relevant articles to reflect the change in Obergefell is 
unlikely because Louisiana has a history of not redrafting Civil Code
articles when Supreme Court decisions conflict with traditional moral
beliefs of the state.335 In addition, the Louisiana Legislature has explicitly
refused to make even modest changes to the filiation articles, although the
Louisiana Law Institute presented the legislature with many language-
proposal changes and a bill in 2018.336 Although the Louisiana Legislature
may not entirely redraft the articles related to marriage and filiation in the
near future, the Louisiana Legislature should at least redraft the most
330. Boquet v. Boquet, 269 So. 3d 895, 897 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019).
331. See discussion supra Part I.A.
332. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 223, 224, 228, 2315.1–.2.
333. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art. 185.
334. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670.
335. The Louisiana Legislature did not update the abortion statutes until 1991
despite the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on a woman’s legal right to an abortion in
its decision in Roe v. Wade in in 1973. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); LA 
REV. STAT. § 14: 89 (2019). In this instance, the Louisiana Legislature was almost 
20 years late in conforming with a landmark Supreme Court case that
decriminalized abortion. Id. In addition, Louisiana still criminalizes sodomy in its
“crime against nature” law despite the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in
Lawrence v. Texas. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
336. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE: MARRIAGE-PERSONS COMMITTEE 
REPORTS, supra note 243; O’Donoghue, supra note 243; see LA REV. STAT. § 14:87.
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1562 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
pertinent articles to make them functional, so Louisiana courts can make
consistent decisions when presented with more cases like Boquet.337 
A. Presumption Junction, Time to End That Function
Article 185 presents the biggest issue for the courts—granting parental
rights to same-sex couples—and, therefore, the Louisiana Legislature
should begin with article 185 when redrafting Civil Code articles relating
to marriage and filiation to be in accordance with Obergefell.338 The 
Louisiana Legislature should amend article 185 to read: “The spouse of
the mother is deemed to be the parent of a child born during the marriage.” 
Amending the article’s language would give parental rights to the non-
biological spouse in a same-sex relationship and effectively remove the
biological presumption that currently exists in article 185.339 Article 185’s 
current gender-specific language, which only references husbands,
prohibits its equitable application to same-sex couples as done by the court
in Boquet.340 The addition of the word “deemed” means that the law would
consider the other spouse in the marriage as the parent of the child.341 
“Deemed” is a stronger word choice than “presumed” for a same-sex 
parent because a presumption assumes something that is true, but a same-
sex spouse married to a biological parent is not the child’s other biological
parent.342 The use of the word “deem” would also satisfy the requirements 
of Obergefell because same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples alike
would both be “considered parents” under the law without different
treatment. This makes a redraft of article 185 the best, most practical
solution to the problem of applying the paternal presumption in article 185
to same-sex couples. This amendment would fix the functional problem
that currently exists in article 185 and would eliminate the biology-based
presumption of paternity.343 In addition, the Louisiana Legislature has
made similar changes to traditional presumption language to “deemed”
language in different parts of the Civil Code. 344 
337. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 185, 188. See Boquet v. Boquet, 269
So. 3d 895, 897 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019).
338. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 675; LA. CIV. CODE art. 185.
339. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185.
340. Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 900.
341. Deem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The word “deemed”
is defined as “to consider, think, or judge.” Id.
342. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
343. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185.
344. As a proposed redraft to Louisiana Civil Code article 185, the legislature
has previously changed a traditional presumption to “deemed.” See id. art. 2545
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2021] COMMENT 1563
Redrafting article 185 to change the “presumed” language to
“deemed” language would align the article with Obergefell, but it could
create problems in other paternal-filiation-related articles, namely articles 
regarding disavowal actions.345 The disavowal action contained in article 
187 is also linked to biology; thus, it becomes difficult to apply the same
“constellation of benefits” to a non-biological mother.346 Indeed, the 
female spouse who did not give birth to the child is obviously not the
biological parent of the child.347 It is not necessary or rational to offer a
woman an opportunity to bring a disavowal action when she already
knows that the child will not be hers biologically. However, if the 
disavowal action is unavailable to the non-biological mother, opposite-sex 
couples and same-sex couples would not be treated equally. Such an
outcome would offend Obergefell because the non-biological mother in a
same-sex marriage would not be awarded the “same constellation of
benefits” that are awarded to a husband in an opposite-sex marriage.348 
However, in this instance, a challenge of this redraft would survive Justice
Kennedy’s heightened rational basis standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.349 
The difference in treatment of offering a husband of an opposite-sex 
relationship a disavowal action but not a female spouse in a same-sex 
relationship is not based on any “animus” against the female spouse that
would make the law fail the heightened rational basis standard.350 On the 
contrary, this treatment actually prevents giving the female spouse an
additional right that a male spouse in an opposite-sex relationship would
not have.351 A disavowal action exists because there is a biological
(“[a] seller is deemed to know that the thing he sells has a redhibitory defect when
he is a manufacturer of that thing.”); The title of and the comments to article 2545
“presumption of knowledge” further show how the words “deem” and “presume”
are used almost interchangeably, which supports that notion that “deems” would
be a proper substitute for “presumes.” Id.; id cmt. b (“a manufacturer is presumed
to know of the defects in the things it manufactures.”) (emphasis added); id. cmt. 
h (“[t]he developer of a subdivision is a ‘manufacturer’ of the lots therein, and
thus is presumed to know the defects of the thing sold.”) (emphasis added).
345. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015).
346. LA. CIV. CODE art. 187.
347. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
348. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670.
349. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
350. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (quoting U.S. Dep’t
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)); see discussion supra Part
I.A.2.
351. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
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1564 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
possibility that the child belongs to the husband.352 This biological
possibility does not exist within a same-sex marriage.353 The only reason
a same-sex spouse would wish to file a disavowal action to eliminate
filiation with the child is because the spouse’s marriage to the biological
parent of the child has ended, and the non-biological spouse simply does
not want parental obligations associated with the child.354 In certain 
instances of assisted conception, where the husband in an opposite-sex 
relationship knows from the beginning that the child is not his, he is not
entitled to disavow; therefore, the law should not allow a same-sex spouse
in that situation the opportunity to disavow the child.355 Finally, a
disavowal action only available to a husband in an opposite-sex 
relationship serves a rational government interest—it allows a man who
can prove that he is not the biological father to overcome the presumption
of paternity, so he does not incur an obligation of child support for a child
that is not his.356 This would also survive Justice Kennedy’s heightened
rational basis standard of review from Obergefell because the proposed
redraft does not involve animus towards the same-sex spouse.357 
The proposed revision to article 185 fixes the most pressing issue of
granting parental rights to same-sex couples after Obergefell and replaces
“presume” with “deem,” thereby allowing the article to properly provide
parental rights to married same-sex couples.358 Consider if a Louisiana 
court is presented with a fact pattern similar to that of Boquet where a 
female who is pregnant from a previous relationship marries her female
partner and then gives birth during the marriage.359 The court’s application
of the proposed redraft to article 185 would be simple because the law
would “deem” the non-biological mother the parent of the child born
during the marriage. In the same fact pattern, if the biological mother had
a husband, instead of a wife, the law would also “deem” him a parent;
therefore, this redraft would grant same-sex couples the same
“constellation of benefits” as opposite-sex couples in establishing parental
rights.360 
352. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
353. Boquet v. Boquet, 269 So. 3d 895, 897 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019); see
discussion supra Part I.A.2 & Part III.D.1.
354. See Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 897.
355. LA. CIV. CODE art. 188 (2019).
356. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
357. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
358. Id. art. 185.
359. Boquet, 269 So. 3d at 897.
360. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015).
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2021] COMMENT 1565
B. A Solution for the Stubborn
The Louisiana Legislature’s resistance to redrafting the marriage and
filiation code articles makes removing the presumption of paternity
unlikely, so in the alternative, the Louisiana Legislature should redraft
article 188.361 Article 188 is another logical starting point for a redraft
because same-sex couples can only produce children through assisted 
reproductive technologies such as surrogacy, IVF, or AI.362 Article 188
specifically deals with assisted reproductive technologies.363 Such a 
revision would remove all gender-specific language from article 188,
which currently reads, “The husband of the mother may not disavow a
child born to his wife as a result of an assisted conception to which he
consented.”364 Article 188 should instead read, “The spouse of a woman
who gives birth as a result of assisted conception is the other parent of the
child provided that he or she consented to the procedure.” In application,
this new language functions as a conclusive presumption that in reality is
a rule of law because it states a fact, which is the function of a rebuttable
presumption.365 The new language creates a conclusive presumption in
that a spouse is the parent if he or she consents to the procedure. In 
addition, no disavowal action is allowed to sever the legally established
parent-child bond, which further strengthens the argument that the new
language creates a conclusive presumption, which means it is
irrebuttable.366 The proposed amendment removes the gendered language
to invariably apply to any couple, which makes it constitutional post-
Obergefell.367 
However, Article 188 relies on consent as a prerequisite for the
“bestowing” of the rights and duties of parenthood even in the proposed
redraft.368 Consider a scenario where there are two females who are a
married couple in Louisiana. One of the spouses conceives a child either
by artificial means or by sexual intercourse with a man without the consent
of her female spouse. In this fact pattern, article 188 would not grant
parental rights to the non-biological female spouse because the conception 
361. Id. art. 188.
362. Id. See generally Dana, supra note 97, at 359. See discussion supra Part 
I.B.
363. Id. art. 188.
364. Id. 
365. Hall, supra note 271, at 1322; see discussion supra Part III.B.
366. Hall, supra note 271, at 1322; see discussion supra Part III.B.
367. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015).
368. Id. art. 188.
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1566 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
of the child lacks her consent as required under article 188.369 Thus, a 
difference in treatment would exist between same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples, because a husband of the woman would still be presumed to be
the father under article 185. Not applying the presumption to the non-
mother female spouse arguably would offend Obergefell by not extending
the same “constellation of benefits” to the female spouse that the husband
of a woman is entitled to under article 185. 370 
Under this scenario, a constitutional challenge is unlikely because
rationally, the same-sex spouse would not want this benefit. In this type of
scenario, it would be unlikely that the non-biological mother would contest
“unequal” treatment between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. On the
contrary, a same-sex spouse would be relieved to learn that he or she 
would not be “presumed” or “deemed” to be the parent of the child under
the law according to this redraft of article 188 because of the lack of
consent. While the redraft of article 188 is a feasible solution to extend the
benefits of marriage as required by Obergefell, a redraft of article 185, as
described above, is still the best solution.371 
CONCLUSION
The Obergefell decision upset many foundational principles of
Louisiana’s marriage and filiation law.372 However, cases like Pavan and
Boquet show that not long after the Obergefell decision, states are running
into legal barriers to correctly implement Obergefell’s holding.373 This
confusion exists because many state filiation laws across the country
assume a genetic link between parent and child, which justifies such laws
containing a biological presumption.374 Therefore, the Louisiana 
Legislature must revise Louisiana’s existing Civil Code articles relating to
marriage and parenthood, specifically article 185, to ensure that they
comply with Obergefell.375 Amending “presumed” to “deemed” in article
185 eliminates the biological presumption that complicates the application
369. Id.; Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (consent is a 
legal term that is a “voluntary yielding to what another proposes or desires; 
agreement, approval, or permission regarding some act or purpose . . .”).
370. Id. art. 185; Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670; see discussion supra Part I.A.
371. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670.
372. Id. at 672, 675.
373. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017); Boquet v. Boquet, 269 So. 3d
895 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019).
374. See discussion supra Part I.A.
375. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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2021] COMMENT 1567
of the article to same-sex couples.376 Most importantly, the recommended
redraft of article 185 ensures that same-sex parents are extended the same
benefits that are given to opposite-sex parents with respect to marriage. 
Eventually the Louisiana Legislature must make major revisions to
large portions of the Louisiana Civil Code that regulate marriage and the
establishment of the parent-child relationship in order to be constitutional
after Obergefell. The proposed amendments in this Comment would be the
best place for the Louisiana Legislature to start. It is time for Louisiana to
extend the fundamental right of marriage and the benefits of parenthood
to same-sex couples.
376. See discussion supra Part IV.A
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